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Abstract 
 
Mandatory reductions in the workweek can be used by governments to attempt to reduce 
unemployment, and are usually assumed to improve the well-being of workers. 
Nevertheless, the net impact of shorter workweeks on worker welfare is ambiguous ex ante 
and little empirical effort has been devoted to identify how worker satisfaction changes 
with mandatory reductions in working time. Using data from the European Community 
Household Panel, this paper evaluates the impact of the exogenous reductions in weekly 
working hours induced by reforms implemented in Portugal and France. Difference-in-
difference estimation results suggest that reduced working hours generated significant and 
robust increases in job and leisure satisfaction of the workers affected in both countries, 
with the rise in the former mainly being explained by greater satisfaction with working 
hours and working conditions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Mandatory reductions in the standard number of working hours have been discussed and 
implemented in a number of countries in recent decades. By expanding the hours for which 
overtime is due, and so increasing the cost of long working hours, one objective was to 
tackle unemployment via work-sharing. A substantial number of theoretical and empirical 
contributions have already shed light on the efficiency of such mechanisms.
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However, reductions in the standard workweek are also implemented to limit the 
supposed detrimental impacts of long working hours on workers’ quality of life (Bell et al. 
(2012), Bassanini and Caroli (2014)). Mostly considered to be straightforwardly positive 
by governments, the net impact of reductions in the workweek is in fact ambiguous. 
Let U = U(c,z) be the individual utility function, where c>=0 is consumption and z>=0 
is leisure time. Under standard assumptions and without any market failure, a reduction in 
working hours, keeping income constant, likely increases utility, as leisure time rises 
without any fall in consumption.  
If we relax the assumption of a perfect labor market and consider an economy in which 
workers differ in their ability, and that wages are function of effort and time which are 
difficult to observe, Akerlof (1976) demonstrates that workers may provide sub-optimal 
excess effort to distinguish themselves from workers of a lower type in order to share the 
output of workers of greater ability. Akerlof (1976) considers the “Speed” of assembly 
lines as the indicator of working conditions to distinguish between occupations, but 
“Speed” can be easily replaced by “Working hours” without affecting the reasoning. This 
“rat-race” leads to an equilibrium in which workers have longer working hours and lower 
utility than in a world in which all workers have the same known level of ability. 
Alternatively, Manning (2003) considers monopsony as the best simple model to describe 
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Kapteyn et al. (2004) proposes a complete review of the most relevant theoretical and empirical literature on 
the employment effects of a reduction in working hours. 
3 
 
the decision problem facing an individual employer under the two following central labor-
market assumptions: there are frictions in the labor market and employers set wages. These 
assumptions give employers bargaining power over their workers, as their labor supply is 
not infinitely elastic. One of the implications here is that employers might impose long 
working hours on their workers that do not maximize their utility. In these two cases, a 
government-imposed shorter working week is also likely to generate worker welfare 
improvements. 
Nevertheless, worker welfare does not only depend on working hours and earnings, job 
quality matters too (Clark (1998, 2005)) and a shorter workweek can have negative 
consequences on job quality. First, a shorter workweek is likely to introduce new working 
practices and thus work intensification (Kelliher and Anderson (2010), Rudolf (2014)). 
Second, in Farzin and Akao (2004), labor is not only a source of income, allowing material 
needs to be satisfied, it also provides “non-pecuniary benefits” like status and recognition. 
Empirical work in labor economics has already shown that the cost of unemployment is not 
only pecuniary (Clark and Oswald (1994), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998)). 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), using German data, suggest that the pecuniary costs 
are actually much lower than the non-pecuniary costs. If labor enters positively in the 
utility function, working-hours restrictions may reduce these “non-pecuniary benefits”. 
Finally, by extending the range of hours considered as overtime, governments expect 
employment to rise. However, the model in König and Pohlmeier (1987) proposes a 
technological difference between workers and hours, and nonlinearity of labor cost, and 
concludes that employment and hours are complements: policies reducing working hours 
may then produce the substitution of labor by capital. This substitution may reduce job 
security and thus worker well-being. 
The net impact of a reduction in working hours on subjective well-being is hence 
ambiguous ex ante, requiring us to turn to empirical analysis, which has to date only been 
limited. To the best of my knowledge, only two papers have explicitly evaluated the 
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consequences of a legal reduction in the workweek on subjective well-being: Rudolf 
(2013) and Hamermesh et al. (2014). Based on a Korean reform, Rudolf (2014) finds no 
significant effect on the job and life satisfaction of the workers concerned, and suggests 
that greater work intensity might have offset any other positive impact on subjective well-
being. Hamermesh et al. (2014), using the same Korean experience and a change in 
Japanese working-hours legislation, rather find a positive effect on life satisfaction. The 
details of these two contributions are set out in Table A1.
3
 
The existing evidence then comes exclusively from Asian countries, and nothing is 
known about the relationship between reductions in working time and subjective well-
being in Europe. In this paper, I aim to contribute to this literature by considering the 
relationship between the changes in working-time regulations adopted in France and 
Portugal at the end of the 1990’s and job and leisure satisfaction. The results in both 
countries indicate that the shorter workweek increased the well-being of the workers 
affected. The main channels for the rise in job satisfaction are satisfaction with working 
hours and working conditions. However, as we will see there are differences between 
country in terms of the categories of workers whose subjective well-being is affected by 
working hours. 
2. Institutional background and Identification 
2.1. Portugal 
 
At the beginning of the 1990's, the average number of working hours per week in Portugal 
was relatively high among European countries (see Figure 1). To move towards European 
standards, the Portuguese government in October 1996 decided to reduce standard working 
hours from 44 to 40 hours per week (Varejao (2005)). This law was implemented 
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 Estevao and Sa (2008) consider the impact of the French reform analyzed in the current paper on 
satisfaction with working hours only. Hamermesh et al. (2014) suggest that this is insufficient for a complete 
welfare analysis. 
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gradually. On December 1st 1996, all workweeks between 40 hours and 42 hours had to 
meet the new standard threshold, while workweeks above 42 hours were reduced by two 
hours. On December 1st 1997, all workweeks had to respect the new standard threshold of 
40 hours. According to the Portuguese government, monthly wages were to remain 
constant during these changes. 
2.2. France 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the unemployment rate in France was relatively high. When the 
Socialist party returned to power at the head of a Left coalition composed of Socialists, 
Communists and the Green Party in 1997, two Laws were proposed to tackle 
unemployment. The first, known as the Loi Aubry I and introduced on June 13th 1998, 
announced a reduction of the workweek from 39 hours to 35 hours for large firms in 2000 
and for small firms (<20 workers) in 2002. Financial incentives to alleviate labor cost were 
provided to help the immediate reduction in hours worked and job creation. On January 
19th 2000 the second Law, known as the Loi Aubry II, confirmed the 35-hour standard 
workweek and provided more accurate definitions of work time, overtime hours and finally 
modified the relevant articles of the Code du Travail.   
The French government stated that the nominal monthly wage should remain constant 
during these changes, implying higher hourly wages. Payroll taxes were cut to compensate 
firms for these higher labor costs. The overtime payment scheme remained unchanged, 
with overtime being paid at a premium of 25% for the first eight hours and 50% for any 
additional hours. 
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2.3. Empirical strategy 
 
The causal impact of the shorter workweek on worker well-being is estimated by 
comparing the change in job and leisure satisfaction for the control and treatment groups 
using the following fixed-effect difference-in-difference (D-i-D) equations
4
: 
                                                                 (1) 
 
Here       refers to the job or leisure satisfaction of worker i at time t and     is a vector 
of standard controls.        is a dummy for worker i being affected by the workweek 
reduction and        is a dummy for observations after the implementation of the 
workweek reductions. The coefficient of interest is   , as this reveals the impact of the 
treatment in a D-i-D regression. In Portugal, the treated are all those who worked over 42 
hours per week before October 1996 and the control group those who worked between 35 
hours and 40 hours prior to the reform;
5
        equals 1 after December 1996. In France, 
the treated are workers in “large firms” who worked over 35 hours per week before 
January 2000 and the control group those in “small” firms, since these workers were not 
concerned by the reform between 2000 and 2001.
6
 Equation (1) includes an individual 
fixed effect,   , that picks up unobserved individual heterogeneity (such as personality 
traits) and year fixed effects,   .The variables Treati and Postt do not appear explicitly in 
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A specification with actual working hours being instrumented by the standard number of working hours per 
week is proposed in the Appendix. This identification strategy only captures the causal impact of working 
hours on satisfaction, as in Collewet and Loog (2014). The D-i-D strategy does not isolate the causal impact 
of working hours on satisfaction but rather captures the global impact of the reform, picking up the net 
impact of the reduction in working hours but also the increase in hourly wages and any other unobserved 
changes that might have come with the reforms (such as work intensification or changed working 
conditions). Even though these two strategies are not strictly isomorphic, their results turn out to be 
qualitatively consistent (see Tables 2 and A5, and Tables 3 and A6). 
5
 The composition of the treatment group is similar to that proposed by Raposo and Van Ours (2010), except 
that individuals working between 40 hours and 42 hours are excluded here. This is due to the small number 
of workers working between 40 and 42 hours prior to the reform in Portugal in the sample (more details on 
the data are provided in Section 3). 
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 “Large” firms have over 20 employees according to the Loi Aubry I. 
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the equation as they are collinear with    and    respectively. Standard errors are clustered 
at the individual level. 
The D-i-D regressions are run separately by country. The samples are similar. Part-time 
workers, the self-employed and workers in apprenticeships are excluded, and we include 
only full-time workers aged from 18 to 60. To ensure the consistency of comparisons, 
individuals working under 35 or over 50 hours a week before December 1st 1996, are not 
included in Portugal. Since the application there was not clear, the public sector is 
excluded from the French sample (Askenazy (2008)). Similarly, managers benefited from a 
special version of the Law, which is why we do not include them.
7
 There is also the 
possibility that employers may marginally adjust their current number of employees 
around the threshold of 20 employees. To avoid the issue of self-selection into the 
treatment, I exclude employees who switch from a large (small) to a small (large) firm and 
who stay in the same firm but report a change in its size between 1998 and 2001.
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3. Data 
 
The empirical analysis is based on data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP). The ECHP is a household panel covering France, Portugal and twelve other 
European countries. This started in 1994 and stopped in 2001, and was carried out annually 
using a standardized questionnaire cover in a wide range of topics concerning living 
conditions. It includes information on income, the financial situation, working life, 
housing, social relations, health and demographics. 
There is no life satisfaction question in the ECHP. Our main dependent variables here 
will be job and leisure satisfaction. These come respectively from the responses to the 
following questions:  
How satisfied are you with your present situation in the following areas: 
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The inclusion of managers actually makes the results stronger. 
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1998 is taken here as the starting point here as the details of the reform were already known in June 1998. 
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- Your work or main activity? 
- The amount of leisure time you have? 
These questions are answered on a 1 to 6 scale, where 1 means "Not Satisfied" and 6 means 
"Fully Satisfied". I consider both job and leisure satisfaction as changes in the workweek 
affect not only the entire income-hours package and working conditions but also decisions 
regarding non-market time. We will also look at satisfaction with working hours, earnings 
and working conditions. 
A growing literature argues that subjective well-being is a good measure of individual 
utility. One advantage here is that we do not have to list and sum up all the dimensions of a 
good job or a good life. Questions about job or leisure satisfaction allow individuals to 
apply their own weights to all relevant dimensions to produce one summary figure (see 
Clark (2015, 2016)). Although concerns can be raised about the validity of such subjective 
measures, there is evidence of strong positive correlation between the answers to 
subjective well-being questions and physiological expressions of emotions or brain activity 
(Urry et al. (2004)). Moreover, subjective well-being measures capture meaningful 
information as they are strong predictors of future behavior (Clark et al. (1998), Ward 
(2015)). 
The ECHP also contains information on job characteristics. Firm size is reported in the 
following bands: “None”, “1 to 4”, “5 to 19”, “20 to 49”, “50 to 99”, “100 to 499” and 
“500 or more”. This allows us to distinguish treated from non-treated workers in France. 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the 
analyses for both Portugal and France. On average, the French report significantly higher 
satisfaction scores than do the Portuguese, except regarding satisfaction with working 
conditions. The share of women is the same in both samples (36%), as is the number of 
children. The share of married and never married workers is significantly higher in 
Portugal than in France, and that of divorced and widowed is higher in France. The log of 
labor income figures cannot be compared as they are in different currencies. More details 
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on the descriptive statistics by treatment group and period can be found in Appendix 
Tables A2 and A3. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate graphically the reduction in working time respectively in 
Portugal and France. In Portugal, the average number of working hours was almost 44 in 
the treatment group and drops to 42 when the new standard threshold of 40 hours per week 
was implemented. The workweek in the control group did not change over time at around 
40 hours per week. In France, the workweek fell for both groups before 2000. However, 
the reduction in the standard number of working hours generated a sharp drop in the 
workweek of treated workers. A D-i-D estimation, as described above, with weekly 
working hours as the outcome suggests that the reform generated a fall of 1.7 hours/week 
in Portugal and of 1.1 hours/week in France (See Table A4). Both estimates are statistically 
significant at all conventional levels. The same exercise with monthly income (expressed 
in logs) as the outcome reveals, as announced by the governments, no difference in the 
change in monthly income between the treated and control groups (See Table A4). 
4. The shorter workweek and subjective well-being 
4.1. Main Results 
 
Table 2 presents the estimates of    from equation (1) in Portugal with standardized job 
satisfaction and leisure satisfaction as the dependent variables, controlling for     in 
columns 2 and 4. The estimates of    are positive and very statistically significant. The 
mandatory reduction in the workweek in Portugal produced a rise of 0.07 standard 
deviations in job satisfaction and 0.13 standard deviations in leisure satisfaction. The 
French results are similar (Table 3), with rises of 0.09 and 0.15 standard deviations in job 
and leisure satisfaction, respectively. The reductions in the workweek were then beneficial 
in well-being terms for the workers who were affected. The rises in job and leisure 
satisfaction in Portugal and France are of the same size 
10 
 
One requirement for D-i-D estimation to yield causal effects is that there is a common 
trend in job and leisure satisfaction in the control and treatment groups prior to the policy 
change. Figures 4 to 7 plot mean job and leisure satisfaction in Portugal and France over 
time. The satisfaction trends in the treatment (solid line) and control (dashed line) groups 
are fairly similar pre-treatment, which provides support for the common-trend assumption.
9
 
I also carry out placebo regressions to test the common-trend assumption. In the placebo 
experiment I assume that the workweek reductions came into force one year earlier in each 
country. The resulting point estimates in Table 4 are statistically insignificant for all 
outcomes, and confirm the common-trend assumption. 
4.2. Robustness checks 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results from a number of robustness checks.  
As satisfaction responses are on an ordinal scale, ordered response models might be 
thought more appropriate than ordinary least squares with individual fixed-effects. 
However, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) demonstrates that the choice of linear or 
non-linear models does not qualitatively affect the results in panel subjective well-being 
regressions. I check the main results by re-estimating the regressions via ordered probit and 
probit-adjusted OLS (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008)). The results, in columns 
(2), (3), (7) and (8) of Tables 5 and 6, do not differ significantly from the baseline results. 
The estimated treatment coefficient is only insignificant in column (3) of Table 6, although 
the P-value is close to the 10% threshold (P-value=0.12). I also re-estimated the baseline 
model without the individual fixed-effects in column (1). The results are qualitatively 
similar but differ in their magnitude. This difference can be explained by measurement 
error and selection. The use of a fixed-effects model in the case of measurement error 
introduces attenuation bias, meaning that FE estimates are always smaller than OLS 
estimates in absolute terms. However, measurement error is not a valid candidate as long 
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 The residuals of the job and leisure satisfaction regressions also have similar trends. These figures are 
available upon request.  
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as the treatment effect cannot be misreported: the treatment effect here is the interaction 
between the variables Treati and Postt. This is also confirmed by the fact that the treatment 
effect estimated in France is higher in presence of individual fixed effects than in pooled 
OLS (0.094 vs. 0.079). Selection can also play a role. In Tables 2 and 3, the introduction of 
the control variables did not affect the magnitude of the treatment effects, implying that 
treatment was orthogonal to these individual observable characteristics. But if treatment is 
correlated with unobservable time-invariant characteristics, the OLS estimates will be 
biased. The introduction of individual fixed-effects will then correct for this potential bias. 
Comparing the results in column (1) of Tables 5 and 6 to the baseline results suggests 
positive selection in Portugal and negative selection in France. 
 To see whether attrition is also a concern, I re-estimate the baseline models on the 
balanced panel: the results in columns (4) and (9) are very similar to those in Tables 2 and 
3.
10
 
Figures 8 to 11 show the distributions of job and leisure satisfaction in Portugal and 
France, as well as the kurtosis and skewness figures. All the distributions have negative 
skewness, so they are skewed left (i.e. the left tail is long relative to the right tail). This is 
commonly-found for most satisfaction measures. This skewness is particularly noticeable 
for job satisfaction in France: 80% of the responses are 4 and 5. To ensure that the main 
results are not affected by this skewness, I split the latter into high and low values of 
job/leisure satisfaction with the median as the cut-point. I then re-estimate the effect of the 
reforms in the baseline specification on the probability of having high job/leisure 
satisfaction. The results remain consistent with those in the baseline (see columns (5) and 
(10) of Tables 5 and 6). 
4.3. Channels 
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The French and Portuguese reforms acted to reduce working hours but stipulated that 
monthly earnings should remain constant. This implied a mechanical rise in hourly wages. 
As the entire income-hours package was affected by the legislation, there are at least two 
potential channels for the rise in subjective well-being: the fall in actual working hours and 
the rise in hourly wages. In addition, the reduction in the workweek may bring about 
changes in working practices and working conditions. 
I can test for these channels by looking at the impact of the shorter workweek on the 
other well-being measures in the ECHP: working-hours satisfaction, earnings satisfaction 
and working-conditions satisfaction.
11
 Tables 7 and 8 show the results: the reform 
increased working-hours satisfaction but did not affect earnings satisfaction. The shorter 
workweek affects working-conditions satisfaction differently by country: positively in 
Portugal and insignificantly in France. These results are not in line with Rudolf (2014), 
who suggests that the positive impact of the reduction in Korean working time was entirely 
offset by work intensification and worse working conditions. Nevertheless, work 
intensification is a positive and convex function of working hours (Askenazy (2000)). Also 
Askenazy (2001) notes that reductions in working time may generate efficient 
organizational innovations and hence improvements in terms of satisfaction with working 
conditions. 
These results suggest that lower actual working hours is a better candidate than higher 
hourly wages to explain the rise in subjective well-being following the reforms in France 
and Portugal. Income satisfaction then seems to be a function of monthly earnings, not 
earnings per hour, so that empirical work using hourly earnings may be mis-specified. The 
shorter workweek may also have produced beneficial changes in working practices and 
conditions (although we only find evidence for this in Portugal).  
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5. Additional Results 
5.1. Exploring heterogeneity 
Overall the estimated impacts of the shorter workweek on job and leisure satisfaction are 
of relatively equal size in both countries. However, it may be the case that the effects 
across groups within country differ. 
5.1.1. Job satisfaction and heterogeneity 
I first consider gender by adding an interaction term “Treatment*Female” to the 
analysis. The determinants of subjective well-being different by gender (Fugl-Meyer et al. 
(2002)), and women likely occupy different jobs and are exposed to different working 
conditions. We might then expect the response to treatment to differ by sex. Table 9 shows 
that the effects of the shorter workweek are only significantly different from zero for 
women in Portugal and for men in France, but the difference across gender is only 
statistically significant in Portugal. 
The treatment effect may also differ by industry or occupation. Workers in physically-
demanding jobs may benefit more from shorter working hours, for example, so that we 
expect a greater treatment effect in Industry and Agriculture. In Table 10, the positive 
impact of the reform on job satisfaction in France is indeed mainly driven by workers in 
Industry and Agriculture.  
Distinguishing the treatment effects by gender or industry first demonstrates that the 
reforms affected different groups within country. So how can we explain that certain 
groups benefited more in terms of well-being from shorter workweeks than did other 
groups? I consider three potential explanations. First, the treatment effect in terms of lower 
hours may be higher for some workers. Second, monthly income may have evolved 
differently across groups. Last, other job characteristics may have changed differently 
across groups. I thus reestimate the D-i-D equations with the interaction terms but with the 
outcomes of weekly working hours, monthly income (in logs) and a set of three 
satisfaction questions: satisfaction with working hours, earnings and working conditions.  
14 
 
Tables A7 and A8 show the results of all these regressions, for Portugal and France 
respectively. The fall in working hours is of equal size within country across groups,
12
 and 
monthly income did not significantly change (See columns (1) and (2)). However, 
satisfaction with the different job dimensions changed significantly and differently across 
groups. The detailed results can be found in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Tables A7 and A8, 
but for clarity are summarized in Table 11. This Table shows whether the impact of the 
treatment on the different satisfaction measures for each group within each country is 
positive and significant at least the 10% level. I also added the impact on job satisfaction in 
the first column of the Table. Table 11 shows almost no heterogeneity in the treatment 
effect on hours satisfaction and earning satisfaction: positive and significant for the former 
and zero for the latter. The results are different for working-conditions satisfaction. Lower 
standard weekly working hours produced significant increases in working-conditions 
satisfaction for mean and Industry in France, and for women and in Services in Portugal. A 
pattern appears when job satisfaction is taken into account: job satisfaction only rose when 
there was a simultaneous increase in working-hours satisfaction and working-conditions 
satisfaction. An increase in working-hours satisfaction on its own does not suffice to 
produce a significant rise in job satisfaction (like in Services in France or for men in 
Portugal). A rise in satisfaction with working hours may then be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for welfare gains. Determining the intrinsic contribution of working-
conditions satisfaction is more difficult, as they are here always accompanied by higher 
working-hours satisfaction.  
This heterogeneity in the welfare gains from a shorter workweek does not reflect the 
different changes in hours of work or labor income. I only observe increases in job 
satisfaction when both working hours satisfaction and working conditions satisfaction 
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translate into a significantly higher level of working-hours satisfaction. 
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increase, meaning that reducing working hours is not sufficient in order to produce welfare 
improvements, working conditions has also to improve. 
5.1.2. Heterogeneity in leisure satisfaction 
Columns (3) and (4) in Tables 9 and 10 show the treatment estimates on leisure satisfaction 
by gender and industry in Portugal and France. We here find no heterogeneity.
13
 The lack 
of heterogeneity here is consistent with leisure satisfaction depending only on leisure time, 
as the drop in hours of work were the same across groups within country (See Tables A7 
and A8). 
 However, a number of contributions in the well-being literature suggest that 
measures like life satisfaction or GHQ have a relative component (Clark (2003)) and 
depend on both own and others’ outcomes. More specifically, Clark and Etilé (2011) find a 
positive cross-partial effect between own and spousal BMI on life satisfaction. The same 
reasoning can be applied to leisure satisfaction, which may reflect both own leisure time 
and that of other household members. We might expect the welfare gains of shorter 
workweeks to be higher for the partnered if leisure is jointly produced. Second, under the 
gender-identity model (Akerlof and Kranston (2000)), partnered men are supposed to take 
the role of breadwinners while partnered women are homemakers. More leisure time for 
partnered men will may not then increase their satisfaction as it violates the gender norm, 
while it may increase that of partnered women. 
 I explore these hypotheses by interacting treatment with a dummy for being 
partnered. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 12 show the results for Portugal and France 
respectively, which are of opposite sign. The positive impact on leisure satisfaction in the 
baseline regressions seems to be completely driven by partnered workers in France, while 
in Portugal it is higher for non-partnered workers (although the rise in leisure satisfaction is 
significant for partnered workers too). The French result is consistent with leisure being 
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jointly produced, with the positive effect of the treatment potentially being enhanced by 
partners deciding to work less, even if they are not themselves affected by the shorter 
workweek (Goux et al. (2014)). To better understand the Portuguese results, I distinguish 
between partnered men and partnered women. The results by country are presented in 
columns (2) and (4). I find no significant difference between non-partnered workers and 
partnered women, while the impact of the shorter workweek is finally statistically non-
significantly different from zero for partnered males. This is consistent with the gender-
identity model shaping male preferences, as the breadwinner role is violated. 
 The above analysis showed that the effect of the reduced workweek on leisure 
satisfaction differs by marital status. I also investigated heterogeneity by the presence of 
children, or the presence of children interacted by marital status, but found no significant 
differences.
14
 
5.2. Spillover effects in France 
The treatment group in the French sample to date has been composed of workers in large 
firms working more than 35 hours per week prior to the 2000 reform. However, other 
workers in large firms, who worked less than 35 hour prior to the reform, may have been 
affected by spillovers. First, Wunder and Heineck (2013) show that underemployed 
workers have lower subjective well-being. Workers working under 35 hours per week may 
then benefit from the fall in standard working hours if firms substitute the overtime of 
treated workers by longer normal hours for those working under 35 hours per week. 
Second, lower working hours and constant monthly income mechanically implies higher 
hourly wages. Under the assumption of collective wage bargaining and the mandatory 
presence of unions in firms with more than 50 employees according to French legislation, 
this hourly wage rise may be extended to the other workers in large firms. Finally, any 
improvement in working conditions in large firms will benefit all workers.  
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 To check whether workers working under 35 hours in large firms prior to the 
French reform were exposed to spillovers, I add them to the sample. I distinguish between 
the direct and spillover effects of the reduction in working time by interacting treatment 
with a dummy for individual i working under 35 hours prior to the reform.  
 I first explore spillovers in the objective and observable outcomes: weekly hours of 
work and log monthly income in columns (1) and (2) respectively. Table 13 shows the 
results. As expected, the working hours of those working under 35 hours prior to the 
reform increased by almost 0.9 hours per week, suggesting substitution in large firms 
between normal and overtime hours. If workers were previously underemployed, longer 
hours may increase welfare, but those who were initially at their equilibrium and were 
forced by firms to increase their labor supply may lose out. Estimating the spillover effects 
on working-hours satisfaction in column (3) shows that workers enjoyed working more 
(suggesting that they were previously underemployed). This rise in working-hours 
satisfaction is larger than that of the treated workers. This may reveal that working hours 
are rival. Clark and Oswald (1996) demonstrates that higher peer income reduces job 
satisfaction; equally, lower peer hours may increase job satisfaction. Moreover, if 
promotions are prizes from rank-order tournaments, as in Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
reducing the gap between employees' working hours (as a measure of effort) in the same 
firm likely increases the relative contribution of luck to promotions, and so the promotion 
probability of workers who worked under 35 hours prior to the reform. 
 Column (2) of Table 13 shows that the monthly labor income of the workers 
directly concerned by the reduction in working time remained constant, as stated by the 
French government. However, the other workers in large firms experienced a 3.9% rise in 
monthly income. Even if this increase is not significantly different from zero (P-value = 
0.111), this would be consistent with the hypothesis of collective wage bargaining. No 
significant impact on earnings satisfaction in column (4) is detected. 
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 It is difficult to measure working conditions here, and I instead consider working-
conditions satisfaction. The results in column (5) do not reveal any significant changes in 
this dimension. 
 As those working under 35 hours prior to the reform increased their labor supply 
and benefited from higher monthly income, we might expect their job satisfaction to rise. 
However, if leisure satisfaction is positively correlated with hours of leisure, this should 
fall. Columns (6) and (7) evaluate the spillover effects on job and leisure satisfaction. The 
spillover estimates here are both positive, but not statistically significant. However, while 
the spillover effect on leisure satisfaction (0.054 with a standard error of 0.094) is far from 
being significant, this is somewhat less the case for the spillover effect on job satisfaction 
(0.066 with a standard error of 0.067). This lack of precision reflects that I cannot precisely 
identify colleagues in the ECHP. The share of workers above the threshold of 35 hours per 
week might differ within large firms, and so will the intensity of the spillover effects. 
Interacting the treatment variable with a proxy for spillover intensity (the share of workers 
working under 35 hours prior to the reform by firm) would certainly increase the precision 
of these estimates.  
5.3. Long run reform impacts 
A large number of contributions in psychology argue that utility is subject to hedonic 
adaptation. According to Frederick and Lownstein (1999), “Hedonic adaptation refers to a 
reduction in the affective intensity of favorable and unfavorable circumstances”. This 
adaptation has been demonstrated empirically using subjective well-being data: Clark et al. 
(2013) shows that individuals fully adapt to life events like marriage, divorce and 
widowhood, but not to unemployment. Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) concludes that 
adaptation to physical disability is only partial. 
 The analysis of adaptation to a reform is of policy importance, as it helps to 
determine whether public spending on labor-market reforms will produce long-run 
increases in happiness. The analysis of adaptation requires panel data on the same 
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individuals for a number of years after the reform. As the ECHP stopped in 2001, we 
cannot address adaptation in France. But the Portuguese reform was implemented earlier in 
December 1996. I explore this question via the following empirical equation for Portugal: 
                                             
 
                     (2) 
 where t=0 in the first year of implementation. Using 1994 and 1995 as the reference 
periods, I estimate the impact of the shorter workweek on job and leisure satisfaction by 
year. The anticipation effects are measured at t-1 and we expect no significant impacts, 
consistent with the placebo tests above. We estimate one coefficient per year, from the year 
of implementation to the last wave of the dataset. If workers adapt to the reform, the 
estimated coefficient should converge towards zero over time; without adaptation, the 
coefficients should remain significantly different from zero and of relatively similar size. 
 I previously compared Portugal and France in Tables 2 and 3 by estimating the 
impact of the workweek reform two waves after its implementation (as I could not go 
further forward in time for the French reform with these data); re-estimating equation (1) 
over all of the five future waves available in Portugal yields estimates similar to those in 
the baseline (See columns (1) and (3) of Tables 2 and 14). This is a first piece of evidence 
that adaptation does not seem to play a role here. Estimating equation (2) yields a more 
detailed picture of adaptation, and columns (2) and (4) of Tables 14 show the results for 
job and leisure satisfaction respectively. The estimates are insignificant one year before the 
treatment, so that there is no anticipation. This is consistent with the parallel-trend 
assumption and the results of the placebo tests. The coefficients between the first and the 
third treatment year are all positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
The effect of the reduction in working time on leisure satisfaction is remarkably steady 
over time, while there is a peak during the second year in job satisfaction. However, the 
Wald tests do not reject the hypothesis of equality of this three coefficients. In the last 
wave, the impact of the shorter workweek on job and leisure satisfaction is a little lower 
but still positive and significant. I should also stress that the estimates are less precise in 
20 
 
the last year due to the falling number of observations in the sample over time for various 
reasons (such as attrition and leaving the labor force). 
 Regarding columns (2) and (4) of Table 14, it is difficult to conclude that 
Portuguese workers adapted to the reduction in working time. The welfare gains do not 
then seem to be transitory and they remain over a number of years.  
6. Conclusion 
 
I exploit changes in working-time regulations in Portugal and France to evaluate the net 
impact of a shorter workweek on worker subjective well-being. These reforms increased 
the job and leisure satisfaction of the affected workers in both countries. A number of 
potential channels are explored. Satisfaction with working hours and working conditions 
appear more important than earnings satisfaction. The positive well-being effects of shorter 
workweeks are larger for women and those with relatively strong family constraints in 
Portugal, and for workers in Industry and Agriculture in France.  
By altering the price of overtime, the Portuguese and French governments then provided 
incentives for employers to offer a new earning-hours package that increased the well-
being of their employees, without a drop in job quality that might offset the positive 
satisfaction impact of the new income-hours package. While the previous literature (Rudolf 
(2014), Hamermesh et al. (2014)) found mixed evidence regarding worker welfare, this 
paper is the first to identify positive and robust effects on the satisfaction of treated 
workers. This paper is also the first to evaluate the long-run impact of such reforms, 
concluding that workers did not adapt to the positive impacts of the shorter workweek. 
These results do of course come from two specific countries and the external validity of 
the present analysis remains open to debate. However, this is not necessarily an intrinsic 
limitation but should lead to further research to understand and identify under which 
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conditions a shorter workweek improves worker well-being and when falling job quality 
may offset these gains. 
 While the present analysis has shown that a shorter workweek benefits workers, it 
should also be stressed that these reforms came at a cost that has not been taken into 
account. Payroll taxes were partially cut in France to ease the implementation of the 
shorter workweek, which continues to represent a significant annual cost. The French 
Ministry of Labor published estimates in 2011 of the raw cost per year between 2002 and 
2010. This rose over time, from 16 billion Euros in the first year to 22 billion Euros during 
later years
15
. Assuming that 7 million of workers in France did benefit from the shorter 
workweek, does an increase of 700,000 points of job satisfaction
16
 worth such costs? The 
question of the net welfare impact is raised here but the results of this article are not 
sufficient to draw any conclusion and further researches need to be done to fully account 
for all the costs and benefits of reduced workweeks. 
  
                                                          
15
 https://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2011/qSEQ110217120.html 
16
 The average increase in job satisfaction produced by the reduced workweek is close to 0.1. Multiplying this 
average effect by the total number of workers concerned in France leads to an increase of 700,000 points of 
job satisfaction (0.1x7,000,000).   
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Figure 1: The Evolution of Working Hours in Europe (1983-2014) 
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Figure 2: The Evolution of Actual Working Hours - Portugal 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Evolution of Actual Working Hours - France 
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Figure 4: The Evolution of Job Satisfaction - Portugal 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The Evolution of Leisure Satisfaction – Portugal 
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Figure 6: The Evolution of Job Satisfaction - France
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The Evolution of Leisure Satisfaction - France
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Figure 8: The Distribution of Job Satisfaction - Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The Distribution of Leisure Satisfaction - Portugal 
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Figure 10: The Distribution of Job Satisfaction - France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Distribution of Leisure Satisfaction - France 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Portugal 
(1) 
France 
(2) 
Difference 
(1)-(2) 
Outcomes:    
    
Job Satisfaction [1-6] 3.927 4.316 -0.389
*** 
 (0.893) (0.981) [0.017] 
    
Leisure Satisfaction [1-6] 3.711 4.005 -0.294
***
 
 (0.895) (1.123) [0.018] 
    
Working-hours Satisfaction [1-6] 3.922 4.229 -0.306
***
 
 (0.822) (1.018) [0.016] 
    
Earnings Satisfaction [1-6] 3.171 3.508 -0.337
***
 
 (1.004) (1.184) [0.019] 
    
Working-conditions Satisfaction [1-6] 4.144 4.144 0.000 
 (0.882) (1.124) [0.018] 
    
Individual characteristics:    
    
Age 35.018 39.662 -4.643
***
 
 (11.00) (9.046) [0.186] 
    
Female (%) 0.364 0.354 0.011 
 (0.481) (0.478) [0.009] 
    
Married (%) 0.636 0.614 0.022
**
 
 (0.481) (0.487) [0.009] 
    
Separated (%) 0.011 0.004 0.008
***
 
 (0.104) (0.061) [0.002] 
    
Divorced (%) 0.017 0.071 -0.054
***
 
 (0.128) (0.256) [0.003] 
    
Widowed (%) 0.013 0.020 -0.007
***
 
 (0.114) (0.141) [0.002] 
    
Never Married (%) 0.320 0.292 0.028
***
 
 (0.468) (0.455) [0.008] 
    
Number of children 0.870 0.861 0.008 
 (0.996) (1.019) [0.018] 
    
Personal labor income (log) 11.212 9.057 2.155
***
 
 (0.405) (0.364) [0.007] 
    
Professionals (%) 0.020 0.048 -0.028
***
 
 (0.141) (0.215) [0.001] 
    
Technicians (%) 0.066 0.203 -0.138
***
 
 (0.248) (0.402) [0.006] 
    
Clerks (%) 0.119 0.171 -0.052
***
 
 (0.324) (0.376) [0.006] 
    
Service Workers (%) 0.167 0.084 0.083
***
 
 (0.373) (0.278) [0.006] 
    
Skilled Agricultural Workers (%) 0.027 0.012 0.015
***
 
 (0.163) (0.107) [0.003] 
    
Craft and Related Trade Workers (%) 0.315 0.211 0.104
***
 
 (0.465) (0.408) [0.008] 
    
Plant and Machine Workers (%) 0.128 0.210 -0.082
***
 
 (0.334) (0.407) [0.007] 
    
Elementary Occupations (%) 0.150 0.061 0.090
***
 
 (0.357) (0.239) [0.006] 
Observations 8575 4819 N/A 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** respectively indicate that 
the difference between the means is significant at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Table 2: The Shorter Workweek and Subjective Wellbeing:  
Panel results in Portugal 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.070
**
 0.070
**
  0.134
***
 0.130
***
 
 (0.028) (0.028)  (0.032) (0.032) 
Observations 8575 8575  8575 8575 
Individuals 2531 2531  2531 2531 
R² 0.005 0.018  0.006 0.014 
Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-
time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation 
(1). Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual 
and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 3: The Shorter Workweek and Subjective Wellbeing:  
Panel results in France 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.100
**
 0.094
**
  0.140
***
 0.148
***
 
 (0.042) (0.043)  (0.047) (0.047) 
Observations 4819 4819  4819 4819 
Individuals 1166 1166  1166 1166 
R² 0.008 0.015  0.006 0.014 
Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-
time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation 
(1). Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual 
and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4: The Shorter Workweek and Subjective Wellbeing:  
Placebo tests 
 Portugal  France 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Job Sat. Leisure Sat.  Job Sat. Leisure Sat. 
Placebo -0.007 -0.048  -0.014 0.004 
 (0.042) (0.049)  (0.053) (0.060) 
Observations 5332 5332  2847 2847 
Individuals 2386 2386  1166 1166 
R² 0.026 0.002  0.015 0.020 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-
time employees in the private sector and the waves after the implementation of the legislation changes are 
excluded. “Placebo” is a dummy equal to 1 one year before the legislation change in the treatment group. 
Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and 
time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Portugal 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Adjusted 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Balanced 
Panel 
High JS 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Adjusted 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Balanced 
Panel 
High LS 
            
Treatment 0.130
**
 0.082
**
 0.313
**
 0.085
**
 0.056
**
  0.170
**
 0.139
**
 0.418
**
 0.123
**
 0.063
**
 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.072) (0.033) (0.016)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.038) (0.018) 
            
Observations 8575 8575 8575 6220 8575  8575 8575 8575 6220 8575 
Individuals 2531 2531 2531 1244 2531  2531 2531 2531 1244 2531 
R² 0.100 0.018 0.041 0.047 0.030  0.074 0.014 0.027 0.014 0.008 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in the private sector and waves after the 
implementation of the legislation changes are excluded. Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time 
fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 6: Robustness checks: France 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Adjusted 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Balanced 
Panel 
High JS 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Adjusted 
Probit 
Ordered 
Probit 
Balanced 
Panel 
High LS 
            
Treatment 0.079
*
 0.110
**
 0.168 0.092
**
 0.051
*
  0.120
**
 0.145
***
 0.221
**
 0.150
***
 0.045
*
 
 (0.043) (0.052) (0.072) (0.046) (0.029)  (0.048) (0.048) (0.098) (0.052) (0.027) 
            
Observations 4819 4819 4819 4045 4819  4819 4819 4819 4045 4819 
Individuals 1166 1166 1166 809 1166  1166 1166 1166 809 1166 
R² 0.053 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.010  0.051 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.012 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in the private sector and waves after the 
implementation of the legislation changes are excluded. Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time 
fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 7: The Shorter Workweek and Other Subjective Outcomes:  
Panel results in Portugal 
 Hours 
Satisfaction 
Earning 
Satisfaction 
Working-conditions 
Satisfaction 
Treatment 0.104
***
 0.004 0.070
**
 
 (0.031) (0.006) (0.032) 
Observations 8568 8568 8568 
Individuals 2531 2531 2531 
R² 0.009 0.006 0.006 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time 
employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in 
equation (1). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: The Shorter Workweek and Other Subjective Outcomes:  
Panel results in France 
 Hours 
Satisfaction 
Earning 
Satisfaction 
Working-conditions 
Satisfaction 
Treatment 0.145
**
 0.008 0.065 
 (0.057) (0.009) (0.058) 
Observations 4819 4819 4819 
Individuals 1166 1166 1166 
R² 0.012 0.011 0.013 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted 
of full-time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction 
“Treati*Postt” in equation (1). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 9: The Shorter Workweek and Subjective Well-being:  
Panel results by Gender 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 Portugal France  Portugal France 
Treatment 0.046 0.105
**
  0.103
***
 0.164
***
 
 (0.036) (0.045)  (0.035) (0.050) 
      
Treatment*Female 0.099
**
 -0.035  0.080
*
 -0.045 
 (0.046) (0.051)  (0.048) (0.050) 
Observations 8575 4819  8575 4819 
Individuals 2531 1166  2531 1166 
R² 0.018 0.015  0.014 0.014 
      
Total  implied 
effect for Women 
0.145
***
 
(0.044) 
0.071
 
(0.056) 
 0.183
*** 
(0.045) 
0.119
** 
(0.052) 
      
Total  implied 
effect for Men 
0.046 
(0.036) 
0.105
**
 
(0.045) 
 0.104
*** 
(0.035) 
0.164
***
 
(0.050) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-
time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation 
(1). Controls include the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual 
and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 10: The Shorter Workweek and Subjective Well-being:  
Panel results by Industry 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 Portugal France  Portugal France 
Treatment 0.086
**
 0.037  0.155
***
 0.128
**
 
 (0.037) (0.053)  (0.041) (0.055) 
      
Treatment*Industry -0.012 0.083
*
  -0.043 0.055 
 (0.039) (0.048)  (0.044) (0.048) 
Observations 8575 4720  8575 4720 
Individuals 2531 1144  2531 1144 
R² 0.018 0.016  0.014 0.015 
      
Total  implied 
effect in Industry 
0.074
** 
(0.036) 
0.119
*** 
(0.046) 
 0.112
*** 
(0.036) 
0.184
*** 
(0.052) 
      
Total  implied 
effect in Services 
0.086
**
 
(0.037) 
0.037 
(0.053) 
 0.155
***
 
(0.041) 
0.128
** 
(0.055) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.  The sample is constituted of full-
time employees in private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1) 
and “Industry” is a dummy for individual i working in Industry or Agriculture. Controls include the log of 
income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed effects. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 11: The Shorter Workweek and Other Subjective Outcomes:  
Panel results by Gender and Industry 
 
Job Sat. Hours Sat. 
Earnings 
Sat. 
Working 
cond. Sat. 
France 
Gender 
Men + + 0 + 
Women 0 0 0 0 
Sector of 
activity 
Industry + + 0 + 
Services 0 + 0 0 
Portugal 
Gender 
Men 0 + 0 0 
Women + + 0 + 
Sector of 
activity 
Industry + + 0 0 
Services + + 0 + 
Note: “+” indicates that the treatment has a positive impact on the outcome significant at 10% level at least. 
“0” means that the treatment has no significant impact on the outcome. Detailed regressions can be found in 
Tables A7 and A8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: The Shorter Workweek and Leisure Satisfaction: 
Panel results by Marital Status 
 Portugal  France 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.186
*** 
0.186
***
  0.038 0.038 
 (0.043) (0.043)  (0.067) (0.067) 
      
Treatment*Partnered -0.081
*
 -0.118
** 
 0.137
**
 0.158
**
 
 (0.045) (0.049)  (0.059) (0.062) 
      
Treatment*Partnered*Female  0.107   -0.065 
  (0.060)   (0.058) 
Observations 8575 8575  4819 4819 
Individuals 2531 2531  1166 1166 
R² 0.014 0.015  0.015 0.015 
Total implied effect for  
non-partnered 
0.186
*** 
(0.043) 
0.186
*** 
(0.043) 
 0.038 
(0.067) 
0.038 
(0.067) 
Total implied effect for 
partnered 
0.105
*** 
(0.035) 
  0.175
***
 
(0.049) 
 
Total implied effect for  
partnered men 
 0.068
* 
(0.040) 
  0.196
***
 
(0.052) 
Total implied effect for 
partnered women 
 0.176
*** 
(0.053) 
  0.131
**
 
(0.063) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.  The sample is constituted of 
full-time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in 
equation (1) and “Partnered” is a dummy for individual i having a partner at time t. Controls include 
the log of income, occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed 
effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 13: Spillover Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Different Outcomes: 
Panel results in France 
 
WH/week Log(income) Hours Sat. Earnings Sat. 
Working 
Cond. Sat. 
Job Sat. Leis Sat. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3) (4) 
Treatment -1.148
***
 -0.004 0.125
**
 0.010 0.009 0.096
**
 0.132
***
 
 (0.150) (0.009) (0.058) (0.010) (0.009) (0.043) (0.047) 
        
Treatment* 
<35 hours prior to the reform 
2.046
*** 
(0.409) 
0.043
* 
(0.024) 
0.147 
(0.091) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.030 
(0.062) 
-0.077 
(0.074) 
Observations 5371 5371 5368 5368 5368 5371 5371 
Individuals 1367 1367 1367 1367 1367 1367 1367 
R² 0.161 0.199 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.006 
Direct effects of the Reduced 
Workweek 
-1.148
*** 
(0.150) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.125
**
 
(0.058) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.096
** 
(0.043) 
0.132
*** 
(0.047) 
Spillover effects of the 
Reduced Workweek 
0.897
**
 
(0.419) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.272
*** 
(0.096) 
0.026 
(0.017) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.066 
(0.067) 
0.054 
(0.095) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds 
to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1). Controls include the log of income (except in column (2)), occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, 
individual and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
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Table 14: The Long-Run Impacts of the Shorter Workweek on Well-being: 
Panel results in Portugal 
 Job Satisfaction  Leisure Satisfaction 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Treatment 0.086
***
   0.100
***
  
 (0.019)   (0.028)  
      
One year before the treatment  0.018 
(0.035) 
  -0.038 
(0.040) 
      
First year of Treatment  0.081
*** 
(0.027) 
  0.095
*** 
(0.034) 
      
Second year of Treatment  0.122
*** 
(0.031) 
  0.107
*** 
(0.039) 
      
Third year of Treatment  0.088
*** 
(0.026) 
  0.100
*** 
(0.037) 
      
Fourth year of Treatment  0.071
* 
(0.042) 
  0.069
* 
(0.041) 
Observations 14045 14045  14045 14045 
Individuals 2531 2531  2531 2531 
R² 0.010 0.011  0.011 0.012 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in 
the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1). *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Review of the existing literature 
Author(s) Countries 
Years of 
implementation 
Reduction in 
working time 
Dataset 
Nature of the 
dataset 
Results 
Rudolf (2014) 
Korea From 1998 to 2008 
44 hours/week 
to 40 
hours/week 
Korean 
Labor and 
Income 
Panel Study 
Panel 
 
 Women: Increase in WHS but no impact on JS and LS 
 Men: Increase in WHS but no impact on JS and LS 
Hamermesh  
et al. (2014) 
Japan From 1988 to 1997 
48 hours/week 
to 40 
hours/week 
National 
Surveys of 
Lifestyle 
Preferences 
Cross-section 
 
 Women: Increase in LS 
 Men: No impact on LS 
Korea 
 
From 1998 to 2008 
44 hours/week 
to 40 
hours/week 
 
General 
Social 
Survey 
 
Cross-section 
 Women: No impact on LS 
 Men: Increase in LS Korean 
Labor and 
Income 
Panel Study 
Panel 
Note: WHS = Working Hours Satisfaction; JS = Job Satisfaction; LS = Life satisfaction. 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics by treatment group and period: Portugal 
  Control Group   Treatment Group   
Variables: Pre-period Post-Period Difference Pre-period Post-Period Difference Diff-in-diff 
Female 0.422 0.393 -0.028
*
 0.370 0.363 -0.007 0.021
*
 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age 35.731 35.706 -0.025 34.926 35.302 0.376 0.401 
 (0.223) (0.277) (0.356) (0.151) (0.193) (0.245) (0.245) 
Married 0.655 0.636 -0.019 0.634 0.640 0.006 0.025
**
 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Separated 0.014 0.017 0.002 0.011 0.012 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Divorced 0.017 0.018 0.001 0.017 0.016 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Widowed 0.011 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.014 0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Never Married 0.302 0.318 0.015 0.325 0.318 -0.007 -0.022
**
 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Children 0.867 0.806 -0.060
*
 0.891 0.831 -0.059
***
 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.032) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) 
Monthly income (log) 11.241 11.338 0.097
***
 11.177 11.282 0.104
***
 0.007 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Professionals 0.026 0.036 0.010
**
 0.018 0.024 0.006
*
 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Technicians 0.097 0.091 -0.006 0.070 0.062 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Clerks 0.194 0.173 -0.021
**
 0.128 0.115 -0.013
*
 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Service workers 0.149 0.132 -0.016 0.173 0.154 -0.019
**
 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Skilled agricultural 
workers 
0.026 0.017
*
 -0.009
*
 0.028 0.025 -0.003 0.006
*
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Craft and related trade 
workers 
0.228 0.222 -0.006 0.311 0.306 -0.005 0.001 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Plant and machine 
operators 
0.115 0.141 0.026
**
 0.115 0.148 0.032
***
 0.006 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Elementary 
occupations 
0.152 0.176 0.025
**
 0.147 0.158 0.012 -0.013 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics by treatment group and period: France 
  Control Group   Treatment Group   
Variables: Pre-period Post-Period Difference Pre-period Post-Period Difference Diff-in-diff 
Female 0.379 0.370 -0.009 0.362 0.363 0.000 0.009 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.031) 
Age 38.101 40.277 2.175
***
 39.091 41.236 2.145
***
 -0.031 
 (0.310) (0.373) (0.485) (0.195) (0.234) (0.304) (0.573) 
Married 0.604 0.624 0.020 0.609 0.635 0.026 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.031) 
Separated 0.007 0.002 -0.006
*
 0.005 0.001 -0.004
**
 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Divorced 0.051 0.061 0.010 0.073 0.079 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
Widowed 0.029 0.024 -0.005 0.018 0.018 -0.000 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
Never Married 0.309 0.289 -0.020 0.295 0.268 -0.028 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.025) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.029) 
Children 0.903 0.922 0.018 0.851 0.848 -0.003 -0.021 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.055) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035) (0.065) 
Monthly income 
(log) 
8.907 8.995 0.088
***
 9.067 9.148 0.081
***
 -0.008 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) 
Professionals 0.037 0.038 0.001 0.050 0.051 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
Technicians 0.158 0.141 -0.017 0.214 0.222 0.008 0.025 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.026) 
Clerks 0.171 0.188 0.016 0.183 0.181 -0.003 -0.019 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.025) 
Service workers 0.120 0.139 0.020 0.068 0.065 -0.004 -0.023 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.018) 
Skilled agricultural 
workers 
0.029 0.030 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
Craft and related 
trade workers 
0.290 0.282 -0.008 0.180 0.180 -0.000 0.008 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.026) 
Plant and machine 
operators 
0.117 0.115 -0.002 0.247 0.241 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.026) 
Elementary 
occupations 
0.077 0.068 -0.009 0.052 0.057 0.005 0.014 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.015) 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table A4: Impact of the reforms on weekly working hours & earnings 
 Portugal  France 
 WH/Week Log(income)  WH/Week Log(income) 
Treatment -1.702
***
 0.001  -1.112
***
 -0.003 
 (0.110) (0.007)  (0.149) (0.009) 
Observations 8575 8575  4819 4819 
Individuals 2531 2531  1166 1166 
R² 0.101 0.287  0.232 0.224 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees 
in the private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1). Controls include 
individual and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Table A5: Two-stage Least Squares - Portugal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Actual WH Job 
Satisfaction 
Actual WH Leisure 
Satisfaction 
Standard WH 0.595
***
  0.595
***
  
 (0.035)  (0.035)  
     
Actual WH  -0.040
**
  -0.077
***
 
  (0.016)  (0.018) 
Observations 8575 8575 8575 8575 
Individuals 2531 2531 2531 2531 
Cragg-Donald F-test - 291.544 - 291.544 
Standard errors in parentheses. The 2SLS results consider the actual number of working hours as endogenous 
and the standard number of working hours as an exogenous instrument. Controls include the log of income, 
occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed effects. 
*
p< 0.1, 
**
p< 
0.05, 
***
p< 0.01. 
 
 
 
Table A6: Two-stage Least Squares - France 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Actual WH Job 
Satisfaction 
Actual WH Leisure 
Satisfaction 
Standard WH 0.253
***
  0.253
***
  
 (0.030)  (0.030)  
     
Actual WH  -0.086
**
  -0.153
***
 
  (0.040)  (0.045) 
Observations 4968 4968 4968 4968 
Individuals 1167 1167 1167 1167 
Cragg-Donald F-test - 69.064 - 69.064 
Standard errors in parentheses. The 2SLS results consider the actual number of working hours as endogenous 
and the standard number of working hours as an exogenous instrument. Controls include the log of income, 
occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed effects. 
*
p< 0.1, 
**
p< 
0.05, 
***
p< 0.01.  
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Table A7: The Shorter Workweek and Other Outcomes:  
Detailed panel results by Gender and Industry in Portugal 
 WH/week Log(income) Hours Sat. 
Earnings 
Sat. 
Working 
Cond. Sat. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Men vs. Women 
Treatment -1.560
***
 -0.002 0.085
**
 0.002 0.037 
 (0.127) (0.009) (0.035) (0.007) (0.036) 
      
Treatment*Female -0.418
**
 0.011 0.056 0.004 0.101
**
 
 (0.166) (0.010) (0.048) (0.009) (0.048) 
Observations 8575 8575 8572 8569 8570 
Individuals 2531 2531 2531 2531 2531 
R² 0.109 0.269 0.009 0.052 0.006 
Total implied effect for Men -1.560
*** 
(0.127) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.085
** 
(0.035) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.037 
(0.036) 
Total implied effect for Women -1.978
*** 
(0.146) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.141
*** 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.138
*** 
(0.045) 
      
Panel B: Industry vs. Services      
Treatment -1.543
***
 -0.007 0.097
**
 -0.005 0.108
**
 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.042) (0.008) (0.043) 
      
Treatment*Industry -0.256 0.015 0.010 0.014
*
 -0.063 
 (0.173) (0.010) (0.044) (0.008) (0.045) 
Observations 8575 8575 8572 8569 8570 
Individuals 2531 2531 2531 2531 2531 
R² 0.109 0.269 0.009 0.052 0.006 
Total implied effect in Industry -1.799
*** 
(0.122) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.108
*** 
(0.035) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.045 
(0.036) 
Total implied effect in Services -1.543
*** 
(0.159) 
-0.007 
(0.159) 
0.097
** 
(0.042) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.108
** 
(0.043) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in the 
private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1). Controls include the log of income (except 
in column (2)), occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table A8: The Shorter Workweek and Other Outcomes:  
Detailed panel results by Gender and Industry in France 
 WH/week Log(income) Hours Sat. 
Earnings 
Sat. 
Working 
Cond. Sat. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Men vs. Women 
Treatment -1.105
***
 -0.009 0.161
***
 0.065 0.123
**
 
 (0.160) (0.010) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) 
      
Treatment*Female 0.018 0.017
*
 -0.048 -0.046 -0.168
**
 
 (0.172) (0.010) (0.069) (0.065) (0.069) 
Observations 4819 4819 4816 4818 4818 
Individuals 1166 1166 1166 1166 1166 
R² 0.242 0.224 0.013 0.011 0.015 
Total implied effect for Men -1.105
***
 
(0.160) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
0.161
*** 
(0.061) 
0.065 
(0.062) 
0.123
** 
(0.062) 
Total implied effect for Women -1.087
*** 
(0.187) 
0.008 
(0.011) 
0.113
 
(0.074) 
0.019 
(0.071) 
-0.045 
(0.074) 
 
Panel B: Industry vs. Services 
      
Treatment -1.140
***
 0.011 0.192
***
 0.041 -0.030 
 (0.185) (0.010) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) 
      
Treatment*Industry 0.049 -0.025
***
 -0.0822 0.013 0.166
**
 
 (0.170) (0.009) (0.066) (-0.12) (0.067) 
Observations 4819 4819 4816 4818 4818 
Individuals 1166 1166 1166 1166 1166 
R² 0.232 0.226 0.012 0.010 0.013 
Total implied effect in Industry -1.091
***
 
(0.160) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
0.110
* 
(0.063) 
0.055 
(0.064) 
0.137
** 
(0.062) 
Total implied effect in Services -1.140
*** 
(0.185) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.192
*** 
(0.069) 
0.041 
(0.068) 
-0.030 
(0.072) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. The sample is constituted of full-time employees in the 
private sector. “Treatment” corresponds to the interaction “Treati*Postt” in equation (1). Controls include the log of income (except 
in column (2)), occupation, region, marital status, the number of children, individual and time fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
